Humphries v. Deland and Barnes : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Humphries v. Deland and Barnes : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Utah Attorney General; Kent M. Barry; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondents.
E. Jay Sheen; Moyle & Draper; Attorneys for Petitioner and Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Humphries v. Deland and Barnes, No. 89722 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1503
UTAH V | OF APPEALS 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
DOCKET NO. Jf&ZyV& ~CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THOMAS RMBUMPHRIES, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs, 
GARY DELPHI a n d M- ELDON 
BARNES 
Respondents. 
Priority No. 3 
Case No. 890722-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
itPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
TO RIM1EW ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
R. Paul VaMIDam (3312) 
Utah Attor^W General 
Kent M. Barry (0231) 
Assistant Attorney General 
6100 SouthMHO East 
Suite 403 
Salt Lake •!%, Utah 84107 
Attorneys 
and M. E 
Responde I Gary Deland, ti Barnes, 
E. Jay Sheen (3749) 
of the firm of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No, 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Thomas R. 
Humphries, Petitioner and 
Appellant 
022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
GARY DELAND, and M. ELDON 
BARNES 
Respondents. 
Priority No. 3 
Case No. 890722-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
TO REVIEW ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS1 MOTION TO DISMISS 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
R. Paul Van Dam (3312) 
Utah Attorney General 
Kent M. Barry (0231) 
Assistant Attorney General 
6100 South 300 East 
Suite 403 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Gary Deland, 
and M. Eldon Barnes, 
Respondents 
E. Jay Sheen (3749) 
of the firm of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Thomas R. 
Humphries, Petitioner and 
Appellant 
022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION 1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
Nature of the Case 4 
Course of Proceedings 4 
Disposition at District Court 5 
ARGUMENT 5 
Summary of Argument 5 
I. Mr. Humphries Had a Right of Due Process 
Under the U.S. Constitution at his Board of 
Pardons Parole Eligibility Hearing 6 
II. Mr. Humphries Had a Right of Due Process 
Under the Utah Constitution at his Board of 
Pardons Parole Eligibility Hearing 9 
III. The Board of Pardons1 Actions Were in 
Violation of State Statutes 10 
Conclusion 11 
022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum X 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Andrews v. Haun. 779 P.2d 229 (Utah 1989) 10 
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 96 L.Ed. 2d 303, 
107 S.Ct. 2415, (1987) 6 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 60 L.Ed. 
2d 668, 99 S.Ct. 2100 (1979) 6 
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 229 (Utah 1989) 9 
White v. Board of Pardons, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 
(July 31, 1989) 7 
Statutes 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure Section 77-27-5(3) 4 
Other Authorities 
Constitution of Utah, Article VII, Section 12 3 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 3 
022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum i i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THOMAS R. HUMPHRIES, ] 
Petitioner and Appellant, ; 
vs. 
GARY DELAND, and M. ELDON | 
BARNES ] 
Respondents. ] 
i Priority No. 3 
1 Case No. 890722-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Mr. Humphries filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, which was dismissed by order of the district court on 
November 13, 1989. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
decide this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(g) of the Utah 
Judicial Code (Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp. 1989). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, dismissing petitioner's writ of 
habeas corpus. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The primary issue on appeal is whether the district 
court has authority to review the actions taken by the Board of 
Pardons at Mr. Humphries1 parole eligibility hearing. Decision 
on this issue is reached by considering the following collateral 
issues: 
022390. mb.ejs.apbrief.hum 1 
1. Does Mr• Humphries have a right of due process, as 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, at the Board 
of Pardons parole eligibility hearing? 
2. Does Mr. Humphries have a right of due process, as 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Utah, at the Board 
of Pardons parole eligibility hearing? 
3. Were the actions of the Board of Pardons at Mr. 
Humphries' parole eligibility hearing violative of the Utah 
enabling statutes under which the Board operates? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following U.S. and Utah constitutional provisions 
are determinative: 
U.S. CONSTITUTION - AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION - AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
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Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
Article VII, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. 
[Board of pardons • - Respites and reprieves.] 
Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, 
Justices f the Supreme Court and Attorney General shall 
constitute a Board of Pardons, a majority of whom, 
including the Governor, upon such conditions, and with 
such limitations and restrictions as they deem proper, 
may remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishments, 
and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases 
except treason and impeachments, subject to such 
regulations as may be provided by law, relative to the 
manner of applying for pardons; but no fine or 
forfeiture shall be remitted, and no commutation or 
pardon granted, except after a full hearing before the 
Board, in open session, after previous notice of the 
time and place of such hearing has been given. The 
proceedings and decisions of the Board with the reasons 
therefor in each case, together with the dissent of any 
member who may disagree, shall be reduced to writing, 
and filed with all papers used upon the hearing, in the 
office of the Secretary of State. 
The Governor shall have power to grant respites or 
reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses 
against the State, except treason or conviction on 
impeachment; but such respites or reprieves shall not 
extend beyond the next session of the Board of Pardons; 
and such Board, at such session, shall continue or 
determine such respite or reprieve, or they may commute 
the punishment, or pardon the offense as herein 
provided. In case of conviction for treason, the 
Governor shall have the power to suspend execution of 
the sentence, until the case shall be reported to the 
Legislature at its next regular session, when the 
Legislature shall either pardon, or commute the 
sentence, or direct its execution; he shall communicate 
to the Legislature at each regular session, each case 
of remission of fine or forfeiture, reprieve, 
commutation or pardon granted since the last previous 
report, stating the name of the convict, the crime for 
which he was convicted, the sentence and its date, the 
date of remission, commutation, pardon or reprieve, 
with the reasons for granting the same, and the 
022390.mb.ejs.apbrief.hum 3 
objections, if any, of any member of the Board made 
thereto. 
Section 77-27-5(3) of the Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure, set forth below, is also determinative: 
The determinations and decisions of the Board of 
Pardons in cases involving approval or denial or any 
action, of paroles, pardons, commutations or 
terminations of sentence, orders of restitution, or 
remission of fines, forfeitures, and restitution, are 
final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing 
in this section prevents the obtaining of enforcement 
of a civil judgment* 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Humphries filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, challenging the 
Board of Pardons actions in determining his parole date at his 
eligibility hearing on March 24, 1989. 
Course of Proceedings 
This appeal is from the Order of the district court 
dismissing petitioner's writ of habeas corpus. Mr. Humphries was 
convicted of issuing a bad check by the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County. Mr. Humphries filed a pro se petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in May of 1989, seeking a determination 
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his 
criminal trial, that he was denied compulsory process at trial, 
that the evidence at his trial was insufficient to establish his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he was denied due 
process of law at his eligibility parole hearing before the Board 
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of Pardons when it considered inaccurate information as to Mr. 
Humphries' prior criminal record in setting his parole date. 
The State filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Humphries' 
petition on May 22, 1989, and a supplemental motion to dismiss on 
June 28, 1989. Following a hearing before Judge Noel on August 
25, 1989, the State's motion to dismiss was granted as to every 
issue but the Board of Pardons denial of due process issue. 
Following the submission of written memoranda by 
counsel as to the remaining portion of the State's motion to 
dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the district 
court dismissed Mr. Humphries' petition by order dated 
November 13, 1989. 
Disposition at District Court 
The State's motion to dismiss Mr. Humphries' Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus was granted. The district court's 
minute entry dated October 24, 1989, noted that "Section 77-27-
5(3) Utah Code Annotated prevents the Court from reviewing the 
decision of the Board of Pardons, as Petitioner is here asking 
the Court to do. For this reason and for the reasons stated in 
Respondents' memo the motion to dismiss is granted." 
ARGUMENT 
Summary of Argument 
The Board of Pardons actions in considering two prior 
felony convictions erroneously indicated on Mr. Humphries' prior 
criminal record in determining Mr. Humphries' parole date were 
violative of his rights of due process under the United States 
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and Utah constitutions. Those same actions constitute violations 
by the Board of Pardons of the State statutes that create and 
empower the Board of Pardons. 
The district court has the fundamental authority and 
duty to review the Board of Pardons actions to decide these 
constitutional and statutory questions. Section 77-27-5(3) of 
the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure does not preclude review of 
Board of Pardon actions that impinge on constitutional 
protections nor those actions that constitute violations of the 
State's enabling statutes. 
The State was not entitled to dismissal of the habeas 
corpus petition without an evidentiary hearing at which Mr. 
Humphries could establish that his parole date was 
inappropriately lengthened when the Board of Pardons improperly 
considered and relied on an inaccurate history of Mr. Humphries1 
prior criminal convictions. 
I. Mr. Humphries had a Right of Due Process Under the U.S. 
Constitution at his Board of Pardons Parole Eligibility 
Hearing. 
When a state adopts a parole system, it may create an 
expectancy of release which is worthy of Federal due process 
protection (the so-called "liberty interest"). See, e.g., Board 
of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 96 L.Ed. 2d 303, 107 S.Ct. 
2415 (1987) (the Montana parole scheme created a liberty interest 
protected by the due process clause); Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 60 L.Ed. 
2d 668, 99 S.Ct. 2100 (1979) (the Nebraska statute under review 
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created an expectancy of release entitle to some constitutional 
protection). 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals 
has yet decided whether the Utah parole system creates due 
process protections for inmates at the parole eligibility hearing 
stage. However, this Court has approached the issue previously. 
In White v. Board of Pardons, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (July 31, 
1989), the Court, in dismissing a writ of mandamus petition to 
review the Board of Pardon's decision as frivolous, carefully 
noted: "Under the circumstances of this case, petitioner has not 
demonstrated that the Boardfs actions violate a substantial 
constitutional right." (emphasis added). The Court has left the 
door open to consider the constitutional rights afforded by the 
parole system. 
Examining the Utah parole scheme in light of the 
statutes reviewed by the Supreme Court in Greenholtz and Allen, 
the Utah statute grants the Board of Pardons broad discretion in 
administering the parole system. So too do the Nebraska and 
Montana statutes reviewed in Greenholtz and Allen. As the Court 
in Greenholtz noted, the Nebraska parole statute is lenient in 
its notice and hearing provisions and does not require a 
submission of all evidence on which the board of pardons makes 
its decision. By contrast, the Utah Constitution requires its 
Board of Pardons to hold hearings "in open session, after 
previous notice of the time and place of such hearing has been 
given. The proceedings and decisions of the Board, with the 
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reasons therefor in each case . . . shall be reduced to writing, 
and filed with all papers used upon the hearing . . . ." Article 
VII, Section 12, Constitution of Utah. 
This distinction in the Utah law, requiring full 
disclosure and reasoned decisions in Board of Pardon 
deliberations, is critically important in assessing the "liberty 
interest" of an inmate in parole eligibility hearings. As the 
Supreme Court in Greenholtz stated: "It is axiomatic that due 
process fis flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands.f . . . The function of legal 
process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in 
the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous 
decisions." 442 U.S. at 12-13 (citations omitted). 
The State of Utah has placed the highest value it can, 
inclusion in the State's Constitution, on having a complete 
record of all information considered by the Board of Pardons in 
its hearings. Further, the Board must make its decisions in 
writing, "with the reasons therefor." The very concept of full 
disclosure and reasoned opinions carries with it the requirement 
that evidence before the Board be as accurate as possible, and 
the judicial system has found that accuracy is promoted by 
granting interested parties the right to confront and correct 
inaccuracies. From that accuracy of information, inmates 
naturally expect fair and evenhanded treatment from the Board in 
establishing parole dates. If the information is inaccurate, 
inmates have a right, a fundamental right of due process, to 
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correct the record, to confront the inaccuracies, in the hope of 
receiving a fair parole date. That is a liberty interest 
protected by the Federal Constitution, and created by the Utah 
parole system. 
II. Mr. Humphries had a Right of Due Process Under the Utah 
Constitution at his Board of Pardons Parole Eligibility 
Hearing. 
Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah 
provides that lf[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, o 
property, without due process of law." While State due process 
requirements must at least meet Federal due process standards, 
there is not prohibition against providing additional due proces 
protections. 
In Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court, in discussing factors that could justify 
successive petitions for writ of habeas corpus, noted the 
"fundamental unfairness" factor. In a footnote the court 
explained: "The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit apparently believes that our 'fundamental unfairness1 
ground is a constitutional due process ground. . . . It is not 
that. There can be occasions where a trial was infected with a 
fundamental unfairness that would not meet federal due process 
standards." Id. at 1037 n. 10 (citation omitted). 
Similar reasoning can be used by this Court to find 
that the Board of Pardons consideration of inaccurate informatio 
in determining Mr. Humphries1 eligibility for parole violated a 
"fundamental unfairness" test, whether or not Federal due proces 
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rights were violated. Whether the test is denoted State 
procedural due process or common law, it should be invoked to 
protect the integrity of the parole hearing process, particularly 
in light of the State's avowed interest in complete and accurate 
information being before the Board of Pardons. 
III. The Board of Pardons' Actions Were in Violation of State 
Statutes. 
The Board's actions in considering false prior criminal 
records and refusing to allow Mr. Humphries to refute the false 
information, as alleged by Mr. Humphries, are violative of the 
Board's enabling statutes. The State's motion to dismiss assumed 
the accuracy of Mr. Humphries' allegations. The propriety of 
court review of Board of Pardon decisions, and the necessity of 
the Board's abiding by the statutes creating it, were both 
reinforced by the recent decision of Andrews v. Haun, 779 P.2d 
229 (1989). In Andrews, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
Board of Pardons erred by not disclosing certain documents that 
were before it as required by Section 12 of Article VII of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Even in the face of Andrews, the State argued 
(successfully at the district court) that, as a matter of law, 
Mr. Humphries has no protectible interest in the accuracy of 
information before the Board at his parole eligibility hearing 
and has no forum in which he can challenge the Board's action in 
giving weight to the inaccurate information in rendering their 
parole eligibility decision. The logical result of the State's 
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reasoning is that, while the Constitution requires full 
disclosure of all information relied upon by the Board of Pardons 
in rendering its decisions, that information can be completely 
erroneous and no illegality has occurred and no recourse lies for 
the decision rendered on the basis of the erroneous information. 
That cannot be the law. 
Conclusion 
The courts have the authority and the responsibility to 
review Board of Pardon decisions when those decisions are made in 
violation of an inmate's right of due process or when they 
involve violation by the Board of its State statutory and 
constitutional mandate. Mr. Humphries is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing to test the validity of his claims. 
DATED: February 26, 1990. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
BY I . \<^L .^^JtJUi 
E. Jay JSheeij 
Attorneys for Thomas R. 
Humphries, Petitioner 
and Appellant 
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